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PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND 
OLIGARCHY: THE CASE OF THE ICAEW
Abstract: This paper examines the difficulty of achieving representa-
tive and effective governance of a professional body. The collective 
studied for this purpose is the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (formed 1880) which, throughout its existence, 
has possessed the largest membership among British accounting as-
sociations. Drawing on the political theory of organization, we will 
explain why, despite a series of measures taken to make the constitu-
tion of its Council more representative between formation date and 
1970, the failure of the 1970 scheme for integrating the entire U.K. 
accountancy profession remained attributable to the “detachment of 
office bearers from their constituents” [Shackleton and Walker, 2001, 
p. 277]. We also trace the failure of attempts to restore the Council’s 
authority over a period approaching four decades since that “disaster” 
occurred [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637]. 
INTRODUCTION
Voluntary associations in common with organizational enti-
ties in general have at the apex of their administrative structure 
a body charged with the responsibility of leadership. In the case 
of professional associations, such leadership has as a central 
motivation the pursuit of the professional project on behalf of 
its members. However, Macdonald [1995, pp. 57-58, 204-205] ex-
plains how the membership of a professional body can constrain 
the capacity of its leadership to mobilize economic, social, po-
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litical, and organizational resources in pursuit of a professional 
project. Using the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW) for this case study, we find no shortage of 
examples of this happening in the last ten years or so. For ex-
ample, the Council’s 2001 proposal to restructure the ICAEW’s 
traditional district society system was overtly challenged and 
contended in a poll [Accountancy, August 2001, p. 12]. Council’s 
plans in1996 and 1999 to introduce electives (optional papers) 
into the ICAEW’s final examinations met strong opposition and 
were rejected by the membership [Accountancy, February 1996, 
p. 11; July 1999, p. 6]. Indeed, members have been proactive as 
well as reactive in challenging the authority of Council. Initia-
tives taken in 1996 and 1998, designed to achieve direct election 
of the ICAEW president by the membership rather than by the 
Council, although defeated in a poll, have been judged to effect a 
diminution of its credibility [Accountancy, February 1996, p. 12; 
July 1998, p. 20]. 
Momentous events that further highlight the persistent lack 
of authority on the part of the Council are the series of failed 
merger initiatives, including a number in the recent past, where 
the aspirations of the ICAEW’s leadership were thwarted by the 
membership. The fragmented organizational structure of the 
U.K. accountancy profession can be traced to the diverse nature 
of the work undertaken by British accountants in the second 
half of the 19th century [Edwards and Walker, 2007]. Merger 
initiatives have been intended to reduce the plethora of societies 
which, for example, totaled at least 17 in the early 1930s [Stacey, 
1954, p. 138] and, as a result, produce the advantages associated 
with a more unified accountancy profession [Shackleton and 
Walker, 2001, p. 166; Council Minutes Book Y, p. 148]. There 
have of course been important instances of successful mergers 
which include amalgamation of the five societies formed in Eng-
lish cities (Liverpool, London, Manchester, and Sheffield) during 
the 1870s to create the ICAEW in 1880; combination of the three 
city-based (Aberdeen, Edinburgh, and Glasgow) societies formed 
in Scotland in the 19th century to create the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) in 1951; and the merger of 
the London Association of Accountants and the Corporation of 
Accountants in Scotland to form, in 1939, what is today known 
as the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants [Edwards, 
2003]. The only other major reorganization of the British ac-
counting profession occurred in 1957 when the second largest 
accountancy body in Britain, the Society of Incorporated Ac-
countants and Auditors, was dissolved with its members joining 
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one or other of the then three chartered bodies. 
There has been no further merger involving any of the 
senior professional bodies in Britain for half a century, during 
which time many initiatives have in fact been mounted only 
to have then foundered. The first of these marked an event 
which serves as the focal point for this study – the “disaster” 
[Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637] that occurred when the 
ICAEW’s membership rejected its leadership’s plan to merge 
all six senior accountancy bodies in 1970. Subsequent aborted 
merger plans include the ICAS with the ICAEW in 1989, the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) 
with the ICAEW in 1990 and 2005, and the Chartered Institute 
of Management Accountants with the ICAEW in 1996 and 2004. 
The reasons for failure are seen to be broadly common, “internal 
wrangling and fiercely guarded brand values” [Perry, 2004].1 
Every time a proposed merger fails, division between the 
ICAEW Council and its membership is highlighted [Wild, 2005], 
the authority of Council is problematized, and more representa-
tive arrangements in the Council’s composition are demanded. 
For example, a letter published in Accountancy [July 1996, p. 
130] stated that:
Elected but out of touch…Not only is there no means 
by which the elected Council members do receive the 
views of their constituents, but their behavior in recent 
years has shown them to be seriously out of touch with 
members’ wishes. The issue of merger, for example, has 
shown time and time again that the Council members 
did not know, or chose to ignore, the view of their con-
stituents.
The purposes of this study are to explain why the ICAEW 
Council came to be “detached” from the interests of the mem-
bership, lost its authority with the membership, and subse-
quently failed to re-establish it. To achieve these objectives, the 
remainder of this paper is constructed in the following manner. 
First, we locate our study within the relevant prior accounting 
history literature. Next, we review germane features of the politi-
cal theory of organization to establish an analytical framework 
for examining the intra-organizational dynamics between dif-
ferent groups of members within the ICAEW. We then consider 
whether the ICAEW’s internal regulations succeeded in making 
provision for a democratically run organization and identify 
1 See also, “Membership ‘Time Bomb’ Drives ICAEW Merger Plan” [2004] and 
“Members Split on ICAEW-CIMA-CIPFA Merger” [2004].
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and distinguish types of criticisms directed in practice at the 
representative character of the leadership by members and the 
professional press. In so doing, and by reference to the analyti-
cal framework, we trace and analyze the reform of the arrange-
ments made for the election of ICAEW councilors during the 
period prior to 1970, and consider their effectiveness. We then 
examine the reasons for the collapse of the scheme for integrat-
ing the entire British accountancy profession, drawing attention 
to and presenting evidence to demonstrate the “detachment of 
office bearers from their constituents” [Shackleton and Walker, 
2001, p. 277]. Finally, we examine and analyze the failure of nu-
merous attempts to restore the Council’s authority over a period 
approaching four decades since that calamity occurred.
The main primary sources consulted for the purpose of 
this study are located at the Guildhall Library, London, and the 
ICAEW’s office in Milton Keynes. 
INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS IN  
ACCOUNTING HISTORY
There exists a substantial critical literature on the profes-
sionalization of accountancy which is marked by studies of 
closure strategies2 pursued by professional accountancy bodies. 
Many of the works of this genre focus on external relationships – 
inter-organizational, inter-occupational, and, particularly, state-
profession – in the endeavor to offer a “coherent explanation 
of why some occupations [or segments] successfully become 
accepted as professionalized whilst others do not” [Cooper and 
Robson, 1990, p. 374]. There is also a developing literature that 
spotlights the significance of intra-organizational relationships 
within an accountancy body, focusing, in the main, on dichoto-
mies between the leadership and the rank-and-file. 
Extending work on closure strategies, one strand of the 
studies of internal relationships examines the interface between 
the accounting profession and the state. Chua and Poullaos 
[1993] include an examination of the need to address the con-
cerns of practitioners and non-practitioners when Victorian ac-
countants were attempting to secure state recognition by royal 
charter between 1885 and 1906. Carnegie et al. [2003] employ 
the prosopo grahical method of inquiry to explain why key 
members of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria, 
2 Murphy [1984, p. 548] defines closure as “the process of mobilizing power in 
order to enhance or defend a group’s share of rewards or resources.” 
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transferred their allegiance to the Australasian Corporation of 
Public Accountants in order to better pursue acquisition of a 
charter for those in public practice. Richardson’s [1989, p. 415] 
study of the regulation of accountancy “illustrates the relation-
ship between the internal social order of the profession and its 
involvement in corporatist structures in one particular jurisdic-
tion,” that of Ontario, Canada. He draws on Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony to examine the way in which consent was manu-
factured and dissent managed during creation of the Public Ac-
countants Council. Shackleton’s [1995, p. 40] study of Scottish 
chartered accountants up to World War I reveals “significant 
schisms” within the membership of the dominant Society of 
Accountants in Edinburgh that problematized relationships 
with the state over the period 1853-1916. Noguchi and Edwards’ 
[2004a] study of the ICAEW leadership’s determination to ensure 
that its 1944 submission to the Cohen Committee on Company 
Law Amendment was consistent with state priorities resulted in 
rejection of unwelcome proposals put forward by district societ-
ies and refusal of requests to make independent submissions. 
Noguchi and Edwards [2004b] reveal disagreement between 
practicing and industrial members concerning how to tackle the 
pressing issue of inflation accounting between 1948 and 1966, 
and demonstrate how the Council of the ICAEW resolved this 
internal conflict within the constraints imposed by the need to 
be seen to behave in the “public interest.”
A second type of intra-organizational investigation focuses 
on the interaction between the leadership and the membership 
of an accountancy body over contentious issues such as merger 
with other professional associations. Often, a key concern of the 
members is the loss of product branding which is deemed to be 
an important part of members’ identity in the marketplace and, 
therefore, “infused with value” [Richardson and Jones, 2007, 
pp. 135-136]. Richardson and Jones show the process through 
which the 2004 proposed merger between the Canadian Insti-
tute of Chartered Accountants and CMA Canada failed, “largely 
because of the reaction of members of each association to ei-
ther the potential loss of their designation [in order to join the 
merged body] or the dilution of their ‘brand’ equity [by granting 
the continuing designation to new members through the merger 
rather than through traditional entry processes].” In the U.S., 
the AICPA’s global credential initiative was put to a vote, in 
January 2002, which “revealed a startling disconnect between 
the elite of the profession and the members in whose name they 
claimed to work” [Fogarty et al., 2006, p.16; see also, Shafer 
5
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and Gendron, 2005]. Within the British context, Shackleton and 
Walker’s [2001, p. 235] study of the period 1957-1970 explains 
how Henry Benson’s early (1966) acknowledgment of the fact 
that the merger “proposals would initially involve dilution and, 
therefore, a reduction in status as a starting point” proved too 
bitter a pill for ICAEW members to swallow. 
Following the second line of investigation, this study 
conducts a theoretically informed analysis of conflict of inter-
est between different groups of the membership arising from 
the constitutional arrangements made for the election of the 
ICAEW’s Council. In the next section, we review relevant aspects 
of the political theory of organization to establish the analytical 
framework for this study.
POLITICAL THEORY OF ORGANIZATION
Building on Max Weber’s thesis on bureaucracy, Michels 
[1962, p. 365] formulated a political theory called “the iron 
law of oligarchy” in his book Political Parties, first published in 
1911. “Whoever says organization, says oligarchy,” he argued, 
on the grounds that all forms of organization, as the inevitable 
outcome of their growth, eventually develop into an oligarchic 
polity despite the continued existence of formal democratic 
practices. Jenkins [1977, p. 569] called this facet of Michels’ iron 
law the “organizational transformation” thesis. Scott [2003, p. 
343] agrees that “most unions, most professional associations 
and other types of voluntary associations, and most political 
parties exhibit oligarchical leadership structures.” 
Emergence of Oligarchy: Following Cassinelli [1953], Jenkins 
[1977, p. 571] defines oligarchy as “the ability of a minority in an 
organization, generally the formal leadership, to make decisions 
free of controls exercised by the remainder of the organization, 
generally the membership,” and further explains: “For a volun-
tary organization officially committed to pursuing the interests 
of members…oligarchy means that the policies of the organiza-
tion reflect the preferences of elites rather than the views and 
interests of its members.”3
Oligarchy emerges because leaders of the organization wish 
to maintain their place on the ruling body and “because the po-
sitions provide them with economic rewards and social status” 
3 Leach [2005, p. 316] stated that “oligarchy is best understood as a particular 
distribution of illegitimate power that has become entrenched over time.”
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[Osterman, 2006, p. 623]. Once leaders are appointed, they use 
their position to maintain, or if possible enhance, their power or 
attendant prestige by controlling the flow of information within 
the organization and mobilizing their political and organi-
zational resources, with the result that the rank-and-file of the 
organization are deprived of opportunities to exercise its own 
power to challenge the leadership [Lipset et al., 1956]. Accord-
ing to Jenkins [1977, p. 569]:
As the organization experiences membership increase, 
the ability of members to participate directly in the 
making of policy is curtailed. The members may retain 
formal control through the election of officers. How-
ever, growth also entails installation of centralized 
means of communication and formalized procedures. 
Both of these factors insulate officers from controls by 
members despite the check of periodic elections. Of-
ficers can use centralized communications to control 
the agenda of issues and can block challenges through 
formal procedures and administrative co-optation.
Importantly, the leaders have the power to co-opt junior 
officials who share their values and orientation, with the result 
that the oligarchy becomes self-perpetuating.
Subsequent Development of Political Theory: Empirical and 
theoretical studies that followed the Weber-Michels model of 
organization elaborated it along three main lines – an explica-
tion of the sources, dynamics, and consequences of the “iron 
law”; an empirical testing of the model; and “an examination of 
contingent circumstances in which the iron law does not take 
hold or when it is reversed” [Osterman, 2006, p. 622]. The third 
line is particularly significant because it amends the model’s 
universality by arguing that the advent of oligarchy is not inevi-
table, as Michels claimed, but contingent on a particular set of 
conditions.
The case for the contingent nature of oligarchy was per-
suasively presented by Zald and Ash [1966, pp. 328, 340], who 
criticized the Weber-Michels model as ignoring environmental 
factors surrounding organizations and insisted that “the Weber-
Michels model can be subsumed under a more general ap-
proach…which specifies the condition under which alternative 
transformation processes take place.” They examined various 
conditional terms, both internal and external (including interac-
tion with other organizations), and concluded that there is no 
evidence confirming the inevitable advent of oligarchy.
7
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The argument of Zald and Ash [1966] encouraged subse-
quent empirical studies of the contingent nature of oligarchy. 
Jenkins [1977, p. 570], drawing on the results of Edelstein and 
Warner [1976] and Rothschild-Whitt [1976], argued that the 
advent of oligarchy depends upon such factors as absence of 
influential factions, weak procedural guarantees in competitive 
elections, and differences in ideological commitments between 
elite and general members. Other studies identify the following 
additional conditions that influence whether oligarchy emerges 
– characteristics and social status of the organization’s members 
[Lipset et al., 1956; Clemens, 1993], decision-making structure, 
characteristics of the leadership, and age of the organization 
[Staggenborg, 1988; Minkoff, 1999].
Germane to this study, the question of how organizations 
can reverse or break away from an oligarchic situation has also 
been actively researched [Osterman, 2006, p. 625]. Voss and 
Sherman [2000, p. 304] examined the revitalization process of 
the American labor movement that had suffered “the entrenched 
leadership and conservative transformation associated with 
Michels’s iron law of oligarchy,” while Isaac and Christiansen 
[2002] depicted the process of how workplace labor militancy 
was revitalized by civil rights movement insurgencies and 
organi zation. The most widely recognized phenomenon caused 
by oligarchy is loss of commitment and energy on the part of the 
membership, which Zald and Ash [1966, p. 334] called “becalm-
ing.” Piven and Cloward [1977] described how membership’s en-
ergy is lost when an organization for a poor peoples’ movement 
becomes bureaucratized, while Voss and Sherman [2000] re-
vealed that the decline of the labor union movement was caused 
by the loss of membership commitment. In the context of the 
labor union movement, Voss and Sherman [2000, pp. 304-305, 
309] identified three pre-conditions for overcoming oligarchic 
symptoms and restoring organizational vitality:
First, some local unions experienced an internal po-
litical crisis that fostered the entry of new leadership, 
either through international union intervention or 
 local elections. Second, these new leaders had activist 
experience in other social movements, which led them 
to interpret labor’s decline as a mandate to organize 
and gave them the skills and vision to implement new 
or ganizing programs using disruptive tactics. Finally, 
inter national unions with leaders committed to organiz-
ing in new ways facilitated the entry of these activists 
into locals and provided locals with the resources and 
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legitimacy to make change that facilitated the process 
of organizational transformation. 
Voss and Sherman further suggest potential for their findings 
to be applicable to other organizations by stating that the fac-
tors identified “provide a useful template with which to examine 
other institutionalized organizations that innovate in a radical 
direction or fail to do so.”4 Among the factors Voss and Sherman 
identified, political crisis within the organization5 and an influx 
of new leaders to wield influence, are of importance to this 
study. 
We can therefore conclude that the political theory of or-
ganization is a promising basis for analyzing the problematic 
leadership of the ICAEW because the theory postulates that all 
leaderships have the potential to become oligarchic as they 
grow; the theory is applicable to voluntary associations such as 
professional bodies; the theory suggests that the leadership’s de-
termination to maintain control causes them to pursue policies 
that are in their interests rather than those of the general mem-
bership; and growth in size and the development of organiza-
tional structures limit the members’ power to influence/control 
the leadership. But the theory also acknowledges the fact that 
oligarchy is not inevitable; it depends on internal conditions and 
can be overcome in appropriate environmental circumstances.
CONSTRUCTING A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED COUNCIL
The organizational structure of the ICAEW consists of the 
Council and a variety of sub-systems which include district so-
cieties and numerous Council-appointed committees. The Royal 
Charter (1880) gave Council responsibility for the management 
and superintendence of the Institute’s affairs and, as “the policy-
making body,” it has reigned over the ICAEW throughout its his-
tory. Given the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to consider 
whether the ICAEW’s internal regulations match the theoretical 
characteristics of a democratically created organization.
According to Merton [1966, pp. 1057-1058], “The democrat-
ic organization provides for an inclusive electorate of members 
4 Voss and Sherman [2000, p. 345] added that “the elements of crisis, new 
leaders with novel interpretations, and centralized pressure are likely to be key.”
5 Voss and Sherman [2000, pp. 327, 343] identified disastrous strikes and mis-
management of the local union as examples of political crises and concluded: 
“These crises were important primarily because they resulted in a change in lead-
ership” and that “radical changes necessitate new leadership.” 
9
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and for regularly scheduled elections.” Merton adds: “The demo-
cratic organization must provide for initiatives of policy to come 
from elected representatives and to be evaluated by the member-
ship through recurrent elections of representatives.” Thus, 
In one form or another, a democracy must provide for 
a legislative body: a Congress, a Parliament, or a House 
of Delegates…It is, therefore, all the more important 
that a voluntary association’s legislative body, which 
usually represents the near-ultimate authority of the as-
sociation, be representative of the diverse interests and 
values of the entire membership. 
The ICAEW’s Royal Charter provided that the power of the 
Council should be subject to the control and regulation of spe-
cial and annual general meetings (AGMs). The original by-laws 
provided for the Council to consist of 45 members of whom the 
nine longest serving were required to retire each year and were 
eligible for re-election. Filling a vacancy on the Council required 
formal approval at an AGM. Provision was made for additional 
candidates to be nominated in writing by ten members. In the 
event of a vacancy occurring between AGMs, the Council was 
empowered to appoint a replacement who would retire and be 
eligible for re-election on the same date as the person replaced. 
At meetings of the ICAEW, members had equal voting rights 
and, therefore, were able to make their voices heard and views 
reflected in the organization’s affairs, either directly through the 
approval of major decisions taken by the Council (e.g., propos-
als to reform the by-laws) or indirectly through the elections of 
councilors. 
CRITICISM OF LEADERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS
The previous section reveals that the policy formulation 
and decision-making criteria for a democratically run organiza-
tion were formally satisfied in the case of the ICAEW, and one 
might therefore expect the legislative body, the Council, to be 
“representative of the diverse interests and values of the entire 
membership” [Merton, 1966, p. 1058]. In practice, the Council 
was, from very early on, judged by both the membership and the 
accounting press to consist instead of self-perpetuating elites. 
There were four inter-related elements in the criticism of how 
the ICAEW’s leadership was constituted in practice – over-repre-
sentation of leading firms, unbalanced geographical representa-
tion, biased re-election arrangements, and non-representation of 
business members.
10
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Over-Representation of Leading Firms: The ICAEW’s first Council 
included five cases of two members coming from a single ac-
counting firm.6 Apart from Thomas, Wade, Guthrie & Co., these 
were all London partnerships. The author of the ICAEW’s official 
history, himself a former president, records that criticism of this 
feature of the Council’s composition was aired early on [Howitt, 
1966, p. 28]:
It was advanced that the affairs of the Institute were be-
ing handled by too small and privileged a circle, and at 
the second Annual General Meeting in 1883 a motion 
was proposed to prevent any firm of accountants from 
being represented by more than one member on the 
Council…The question remained a contentious one.
The Council’s response was that this arrangement had been 
given “the most grave consideration…at the foundation of the 
Institute” [Accountant, May 5, 1883, p. 13] but allowed to stand. 
Indeed, it had been created because of the desire to present a 
strong public profile. According to councilor C.F. Kemp, cit-
ing the example of representations made to the government 
concerning the Bankruptcy Bill 1883, “it was necessary to bring 
the greatest possible influence they could obtain to bear, and…
without the recognised names which they possessed they [the 
ICAEW] would not be in the position which they now occupied” 
[Accountant, May 5, 1883, p. 11]. However, to prevent any fur-
ther extension of the representation of leading firms, it became 
an “unwritten rule” that “not more than two partners in the 
same firm should serve on the Council at the same time” [Coun-
cil Minute Book Y, p. 4; File 1490].7
Geographical Representation: The ICAEW was originally formed 
from the amalgamation of five societies, of which four primar-
ily catered for public accountants working in the cities where 
they were formed – Liverpool, London, Manchester, and Shef-
6 E. Guthrie and C.H. Wade from Thomas, Wade, Guthrie & Co.; R.P. Harding 
and F. Whinney from Harding, Whinney & Co.; A.C. Harper and E.N. Harper from 
E. Norton Harper & Sons; W. Turquand and J. Young from Turquand, Youngs & 
Co.; and W.W. Deloitte and J.G. Griffiths from Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths & Co.
7 This rule was abandoned in 1966 because “it could prohibit members who 
could give valuable service to the Institute as members of the Council from being 
appointed to the Council” [Council Minute Book Y, p. 42]. From that date, Council 
adopted a “rule of guidance” that “not more than three members in direct part-
nership relationship may serve concurrently as members of the Council” [Council 
Minute Book Z, p. 92].
11
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field. The inaugural 45 Council seats were, with two exceptions,8 
allocated between the founding associations [Howitt, 1966, 
p. 24]9 and, therefore, were inevitably heavily biased in favor 
of those geographical areas. The geographical distribution of 
Council membership was questioned at the very first AGM held 
on June 7, 1882, when A. Murray suggested that “Such towns as 
Newcastle and Bristol should be represented” [Accountant, June 
10, 1882, p. 10]. G.B. Monkhouse, Newcastle upon Tyne, and 
E.G. Clarke, Bristol, were appointed to the Council later that 
year, and the 1883 AGM was informed that Council had been 
“strengthened” by the election of these “eminent accountants 
from districts hitherto unrepresented” [Accountant, May 5, 1883, 
p. 13]. 
The ICAEW’s leadership did not immediately embrace en-
thusiastically the notion of geographical equality, however, with 
the General Purposes Committee (GPC) deciding in July 1888 
that “it is not desirable to go into statistics of membership with a 
view to redistribution of the members of the Council among the 
various districts in proportion to the members of the Institute 
residing in those districts” [Ms.28416/1, p. 97]. Within a decade, 
we detect a softening of the GPC’s stance when recommending 
in October 1897 that south Wales be represented for the first 
time on the Council through the appointment of R.G. Cawker 
[Ms.28416/2, pp. 10, 15]. Council again remained unmoved, but 
gradually responded to pressure for provincial representation so 
that, by 1901, a revised quota system had been instituted. Of the 
45 available places, 12 were allocated to the four existing socie-
ties (Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, and Northern) and 
a further eight to major cities. The remaining 25 places were 
reserved for London members.
The opening move to improve further provincial represen-
tation occurred at the 1901 AGM when W.R. Hamilton of Not-
tingham complained of “the over-representation of London” and 
requested the Council to take steps designed to achieve repre-
sentation on the Council “in some measure corresponding to the 
[geographical] distribution of accountants” [Accountant, May 4, 
1901, pp. 534-535]. This plea met with a stonewalling response 
8 Through effective political manoeuvring [Walker, 2004, chapter 11], Edwin 
Guthrie and Charles Henry Wade, who belonged to none of the five merging in-
stitutions, were not only admitted as founder members but were also allocated 
seats on the Council. 
9 Of 45 Council seats, 20 were allocated to the Institute of Accountants, 14 to 
the Society of Accountants, three to the Manchester Institute (in addition to Wade 
and Guthrie), and three each to the Liverpool Society and the Sheffield Institute.
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from Ernest Cooper, president 1899-1901, who insisted that “all 
they [the Council] desired was the best possible process of get-
ting the best possible men on the Council” [Accountant, May 4, 
1901, p. 536], further explaining that the role of the quota sys-
tem was to help maintain “a fair proportion between the country 
members and the London members.” If, instead, the matter was 
left to the general body of members, Cooper believed that the 
inevitable result would be “to elect far more London men than 
at present, because the great body would be in London” [Ac-
countant, May 4, 1901, pp. 536-537].10
Continued and persistent complaints from provincial 
members eventually produced positive results, with the grant of 
Council representation often appearing to follow as a reward for 
forming a local society.11 A wider degree of provincial members’ 
representation on Council was therefore achieved, with the se-
lection of members being made by the Council based on nomi-
nations from provincial societies. However, wider representation 
for the provinces did not necessarily mean increased representa-
tion. By 1950, 13 provincial societies had been created, and the 
number of Council members assigned to them was 21, only one 
seat more than the 1901 allocation. The majority (24) of Council 
seats continued to be assigned to London members.
Re-election Arrangements: There were a number of features of 
the re-election arrangements which were thought to have per-
petuated control by elites on the Council and to have made it 
difficult to counter its biased composition both in terms of geog-
raphy and the favoritism accorded the leading firms.
Those retiring by rotation were routinely re-elected, causing 
a contributor to The Accountant to complain that “the Council is 
not representative as it should be by the Bye-laws of the Charter. 
For the last nineteen years (I think without a single exception) 
the Council have re-elected themselves!” [Accountant, June 9, 
1900, p. 533]. Criticisms were also directed, persistently and 
vehemently, at the practice of the Council filling vacancies that 
arose between annual meetings, an action which, it was felt, de-
10 The dissatisfaction among Nottingham members was settled in 1907, 
when T.G. Mellors of Mellors, Basden & Mellors, Nottingham was appointed to 
the Council. The Accountant [December 14, 1907, p. 726] reported that “The ap-
pointment is an excellent one in every way; but perhaps especially so because it 
removes a grievance under which Nottingham has been suffering for some years 
past.”
11 Nottingham (1907), South Wales (1913), Leicester (1930), South Eastern 
Society (1939), East Anglian Society (1939)
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prived the membership from having its say at the next AGM: “If 
a councillor dies or retires a Mr. Brown or a Mr. Jones is given 
the situation, and the members who annually retire by rotation 
are re-elected nem. con” [Accountant, June 9, 1900, p. 533].12 
The issue was raised at the 1901 AGM when Hamilton referred 
“to the very old grievance of the filling-up of vacancies occurring 
in the Council during the year by the Council, instead of leaving 
those vacancies to be filled up by the members” [Accountant, 
May 4, 1901, p. 534]. Proposals that casual vacancies should 
be left unfilled until the next AGM, made at Council meetings 
by such luminaries as Frederick Whinney in 1882 and George 
Walter Knox in 1885, met with no success [Ms.28411/1, pp. 167, 
402; see also, Ms.28411/2, p. 300; Ms.28416/1, p. 97]. Indeed, on 
October 14, 1896, Council explicitly resolved “not to make any 
departure from the existing practice” of filling casual vacancies 
[Ms.28411/4, p. 115]. 
It could well be argued that the members literally had the 
solution in their own hands, but that they failed to exercise it. 
A supplementary report of the GPC, dated February 26, 1919, 
stated that “there has been no notice nominating candidates in 
opposition to retiring members of the Council for the last 32 
years” [Ms.28435/16]. Nor has our examination of the available 
archival data revealed a single instance of retirement by rotation 
leading to a change in Council membership. The Accountant 
[May 5, 1894, p. 408] makes the reasonable point that it was 
“a very invidious task for the ordinary members to object to 
persons who had once been elected.” But members’ inaction 
enabled the Council to respond to criticism as follows: “On one 
occasion a vote was taken, so that the rules of procedure did not 
prevent the introduction of anybody;13 or at any rate the testing 
of the feeling of the members in regard to any person who might 
be put forward” [Accountant, May 5, 1894, p. 408; see also, May 
9, 1896, p. 396].14
The issue of Council control over new appointments also 
had a more general dimension. When a member of a provincial 
12 See also, Accountant, May 13, 1893, p. 453; May 5, 1894, p. 408; May 12, 
1894, p. 423; May 12, 1894, pp. 424-425; December 21, 1895, p. 1031; May 9, 1896, 
p. 396; June 23, 1900, p. 573; March 18, 1901, p. 327.
13 This justification was somewhat disingenuous given that the vote took place 
only because of Council’s failure, due to an oversight, to fill a vacancy created by 
a member’s sudden resignation.
14 The case referred to was probably the only instance we have found of an 
election taking place, resulting in the appointment to Council of F.H. Collison, 
London, in May 1887 [Accountant, May 2, 1887, p. 271].
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society retired, the society had the right to put forward nomina-
tions for his replacement, but the Council reserved the power to 
choose between the nominees. The position was even worse in 
London where the appointment remained entirely in the hands 
of the London Council members. The autocratic nature of this 
prerogative is further underlined by the fact that the London 
members of the Council maintained, from 1899 onwards, “wait-
ing lists” of prospective councilors “in order to ensure continuity 
in the work of the Council and the maintenance of its traditions” 
[Ms.28435/16, emphasis added]. 
It was mainly to address this latter situation that, in July 
1920, a group of younger London members pressed for the 
creation of “a Society of Chartered Accountants for London on 
lines similar to the existing Provincial Societies…to act together 
in a corporate capacity upon questions which arise from time to 
time affecting the interests of the profession” [Accountant, July 
17, 1920, p. 58; see also, Loft, 1990, p. 39]. To appear to respond 
positively to the London members’ concerns, the Council estab-
lished instead the London Members’ Committee. This arrange-
ment failed to satisfy the London members’ principal aspiration 
which was to achieve “the privilege,” in common with provincial 
societies, of “nominating men to fill vacancies on the Council 
as and when such vacancies should arise for London men” [Ac-
countant, January 29, 1921, pp. 121-122]. The London Members’ 
Committee was, in the estimation of The Accountant [January 
29, 1921, pp. 121-122; see also, London Members’ Committee 
Minutes Book A, p. 4], designed only to facilitate social inter-
course among London members. 
It was to be a further 21 years (1942) before the anomaly 
was addressed and, even then, the London Members’ Committee 
(by this time called the London & District Society) was autho-
rized to make nominations to Council for filling a vacancy only 
after consultation with the London members of the Council.
The surviving records of recommendations made by London 
councilors and the nominations subsequently transmitted to 
the Council by the committee of the London & District Society 
prove fairly conclusively that the views of London councilors 
dominated the appointment process [London Members’ Com-
mittee Minutes Books B, p. 188; C, pp. 7, 108, 177, 200, 245, 
263; London & District Society Minutes Books D, pp. 74, 155, 
158; E, p. 3]. 
A final objectionable feature of re-election arrangements 
was the subject of a leading article in The Accountant [May 21, 
1904, p. 669; see also, Accountant, July 9, 1904, p. 41]: “Council 
15
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…hold office…by a sort of ‘apostolic succession’ from the origi-
nal Fathers of the Institute, and in no real sense have the general 
body of members had a voice in either their nomination or elec-
tion.” Apostolic succession meant that councilors, on death or 
resignation, would be replaced by another partner in the same 
firm, and this sometimes would literally involve a son succeed-
ing his father in that role. For example, in 1897, when Council 
rejected the request for south Wales representation, it instead 
appointed E. Edmonds in place of W. Edmonds of Portsmouth. 
Personal correspondence, dated November 29, 1925 from J. B. 
Woodthorpe to Sir William Henry Peat, a London councilor, 
concerning the death of John William Woodthorpe, also demon-
strates this version of apostolic succession: “I believe there are 
several precedents of a son succeeding his father on the Council, 
and, if this should happen in the present case, I should esteem 
it was a very great honour” [Ms.28435/16]. More often there 
would be no family connection, with a prominent example from 
this genre occurring when Samuel Lowell Price was succeeded 
by his founder partner Edwin Waterhouse in 1887. Overall, we 
can therefore conclude that in 1942 and beyond, the Council 
retained, substantively, the character of a self-elected body. 
A final feature of the non-representative composition of the 
Council concerns the complete exclusion throughout the first 60 
or so years of the ICAEW’s history of any representation whatso-
ever of business members. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Business Members: At the 1919 AGM, Mark Webster Jenkinson, 
a London practitioner, argued that “there is a very strong feeling 
among the members, particularly among the younger members, 
that some more progressive policy on the part of the Institute 
itself is necessary” [Accountant, May 10, 1919, pp. 398-399].15 
As the result of his work as controller of factory audit and costs 
at the Ministry of Munitions during World War I, Jenkinson 
had reached the conclusion that cost accounting was an area 
of growing importance, that chartered accountants knew less 
than they should about it and that, if they failed to “deliver the 
goods,” a new profession would spring up to fill the vacuum 
[Accountant, January 18, 1919, p. 46]. Jenkinson’s wide-ranging 
15 The Accountant [January 25, 1919, p. 54] reported on Jenkinson’s proposals 
as follows: “there can…be very little doubt that they will meet with very wide-
spread support among the members of the Institute, and particularly the younger 
members, especially when put forward by so undoubtable a champion of the 
younger generation’s rights as Mr. Webster Jenkinson.”
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proposals for reform included a system of proportional repre-
sentation to ensure fair treatment of each geographical district 
and, significantly, in light of his deep-seated concern about the 
appropriate future direction of the Institute, three councilors 
drawn from the non-practicing membership [Accountant, Janu-
ary 25, 1919, p. 54; Ms.28448]. 
Frederick John Young, president 1917-1919, responded by 
creating a committee to consider the subject consisting of ten 
members of the Council, nine representatives from each of the 
provincial societies, and two other London members of the In-
stitute [Accountant, May 10, 1919, p. 398]. A confidential letter, 
dated April 3, 1919, from R.H. March, a Cardiff councilor, to 
George Colville, secretary of the ICAEW, reveals that the Spe-
cial Committee was formed principally to pacify dissatisfaction 
among members [Ms.28448]:
the Council should not oppose any wishes which might 
be put forward by the general body of members for the 
consideration of this subject, and should be willing to 
listen to any suggestions which may be put forward for 
the welfare of the profession…if a little tact is shown 
now it may have the effect of preventing any show of 
 irritation or temper at the Annual Meeting. 
Given these sentiments and Council’s domination of the inves-
tigating committee, it is unsurprising that its report made no 
provision for non-practitioner representation on the Council. It 
did put forward certain recommendations, one of which might 
have proved significant in addressing Jenkinson’s concerns [Ac-
countant, February 7, 1920, p. 152; Ms.28448]:
(E) That the present procedure of the Council under 
which the Provincial Societies are consulted with re-
gard to the filling of casual vacancies of the Council un-
der Bye-law 10 be continued when such vacancy arises, 
and that as far as may be the representation of the Pro-
vincial Societies on the Council should be proportionate 
to the total membership in England and Wales. 
The Council endorsed the other recommendations without 
qualification, but specifically emphasized that “The present pro-
cedure as defined by the Committee under ‘E’ will be continued 
by the Council” [Accountant, February 7, 1920, p. 152, emphasis 
added; Ms.28448]. 
The issue of business members’ representation resurfaced 
as the numbers employed in industry and commerce became 
17
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more substantial. Table 1 reveals that around the time of Jenkin-
son’s intervention on behalf of business members, just 5% (191 
of 3,797) of the traceable membership worked in business. The 
position then changed dramatically. The number of business 
members roughly trebled in both the 1920s and 1930s and ac-
counted for 17.2% (1,612 of 9,349) of the traceable membership 
in England and Wales in 1939.
TABLE 1
Categorized Membership of the ICAEW in  
England and Wales in Selected Years
Members 31/08/1920 01/09/1929 31/10/1939 09/11/1946 01/12/1956
Public accountants 3,606 5,755 7,737 6,840 9,161
Business accountants 191 518 1,612 2,493 4,337
Total traceable 3,797 6,273 9,349 9,333 13,498
Not traceable16 995 1,444 2,838 2,854 3,409
Retired - - - - 415
Total 4,792 7,717 12,187 12,187 17,322
Source: Membership Lists for 1921, 1930, 1940, 1947, 1957.16
E.M. Taylor who, like Jenkinson, had stressed the growing 
importance of cost accounting in the aftermath of World War I 
[Accountant, June 19, 1920, p. 712], presented to the 1941 AGM 
the following resolution designed to address the absence of 
representation of the rising number of business members [Ms. 
28432/19, emphasis added]:
In the interests of the whole membership of the Insti-
tute, it is desirable that the Council shall include not 
less than five Associates, whether practising members or 
not, and that the members of the Council be invited to 
lay before the next Annual General Meeting of the Insti-
tute proposals to give effect to this policy. 
The Council instead introduced reforms that failed to ad-
dress directly the matter at issue. C.J.G. Palmour, president 
1938-1944, informed the 1942 AGM that non-practicing mem-
bers could “best serve the interests of those by whom they are 
16 Members for whom the listings contain, at best, private addresses are in-
cluded in the “Not traceable” category. The numbers of “Retired” members are not 
separately identified between 1920 and 1946 and, accordingly, are also included 
in “Not traceable” category. The proportion of “Not traceable,” when compared 
with the other categories, is stable at around 21.7%. Thus, the trend revealed by 
the statistics is considered to be a reasonably reliable indication of the increase in 
number of business members.
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employed and the country generally in taking an active part 
in those [technical] spheres rather than in attempting to apply 
their minds to matters affecting the administration of the affairs 
of practising accountants” [Accountant, May 30, 1942, p. 303]. 
The outcome was the formation of the path-breaking Taxation 
and Financial Relations Committee [Zeff, 1972, p. 8] to investi-
gate technical matters and, through its mixed membership, “es-
tablish an active and effective liaison between the practising and 
non-practising sides of the profession” [Ms.28432/19].
The Council’s success in again sidelining the representation 
issue, as occurred with the formation of the London Members’ 
Committee in 1920, was short-lived this time. The Council’s at-
titude towards the representation of business members was at 
last softening, possibly because of the rapidly rising proportion 
of business members, and perhaps in recognition of business 
members’ valuable contributions to the work of the Taxation 
and Financial Relations Committee. Between 1943 and 1948, the 
London and Manchester district societies successfully nominat-
ed four business members for positions on the Council. The situ-
ation was extended and formalized at the 1950 AGM when the 
president, Russell Kettle of Deloittes, announced the creation of 
a pool of up to five Council seats17 exclusively available to non-
practicing members. But he also reaffirmed “the principle” that 
“having regard to the objects for which the Royal Charter was 
granted, membership of the Council should as a general rule be 
confined to practising members” [Accountant, May 13, 1950, pp. 
541-542].
Continued pressure for a greater voice for business mem-
bers bore further fruit through the formation of a GPC Sub-
Committee (Non-Practising Members) in 1951 and the Consulta-
tive Committee of Members in Commerce and Industry in 1957 
to consider matters relating to the interests of business mem-
bers [GPC Minutes Book J, p. 180] and to convey “broad and 
exclusively non-practising opinion held by persons of eminence 
in industry and commerce” [GPC Minutes Book M, p. 175]. In 
the view of business members such as J. Clayton, however, the 
formation of such a committee was not the most effective means 
for improving the representation of the interest of business 
members. He argued [File 5-8-14] that: 
what was needed was proper integration of the two 
[practising and non-practising] sides of the profession 
18 As a consequence, the quota allocated to provincial societies was reduced 
from 21 to 19 and London from 24 to 21.
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and this could only be done by opening the Council 
to more non-practising members. Industrial opinion 
would then be properly assimilated at all levels and in 
all Committees. 
The Consultative Committee of Members in Commerce and 
Industry resolved in October 1962 that the GPC should be asked 
to support an increase in the size of the Council from 45 to 
60, with 15 seats to be allocated to members in commerce and 
industry [GPC Minutes Book R, p. 137]. Also, to help achieve 
“the right balance of sound judgment and experience on the one 
hand and special skills necessary to conduct the wide range of 
its work on the other” [GPC Minutes Book R, pp. 135-136], GPC 
recommended the introduction of a system of co-option of up to 
six additional members as “a reserve to be filled at the absolute 
discretion of the Council” [GPC Minutes Book S, p. 60]. These 
proposals were approved by a special general meeting of the 
ICAEW membership held on September 23, 1965 [Council Min-
utes Book W, p. 154]. As a result of seat re-allocations, the bal-
ance between practitioners in London and the provinces favored 
the latter for the first time in the history of the ICAEW, 24 seats 
compared with 21.
The above four inter-related criticisms, sustained over 
the period 1880-1970 and directed at the Council’s lack of fair 
representation of the membership, raise serious doubts over 
whether the democratic leadership arrangements contained 
in the ICAEW’s internal regulations were effective in practice. 
Certainly, many members thought the Council was not represen-
tative of the diverse interests of the membership, but were their 
criticisms justified? The next sub-section addresses this issue in 
three ways; namely, by examining the geographical allocation of 
council seats in relation to membership levels, the distribution 
of council seats in relation to the size and location of accounting 
firms, and the division of seats between accountants working in 
public practice and in business.
Analysis of Distribution of Council Seats: Over the period 1880-
1970, 308 individuals, including the founder councilors, were 
appointed to the Council [Ms.28411/1-14; Council Minutes 
Books O-AB], of whom 29 were members in industry and ten, 
including two further business accountants, were recruited 
when the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was 
absorbed into the three chartered institutes in 1957. The remain-
ing 269 were practicing members. 
20
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2
21Noguchi and Edwards, ICAEW Leadership
Numerical information concerning the membership of each 
of the main district societies and the number of Council seats 
allocated to the geographical areas that they covered at five dif-
ferent dates between 1907 and 1956 is given in Table 2. It reveals 
that London members were consistently over-represented on the 
Council, based on their share of total U.K. membership in com-
parison with most provincial societies at most dates. The over-
representation was greatest in 1907, but still material in 1956 
when each of the other identified geographical areas continued 
to be under-represented. As noted above, the number of seats 
allocated to the provincial districts exceeded those for London 
for the first time in 1965, with the result that London’s share fell 
from 52.5% to 46.7%. Even then, London members remained 
heavily over-represented as their contribution towards the total 
U.K. membership had declined to 37.5% by 1972 [Council Min-
utes Book AF, p. 231].18
To study allegations that Council membership was domi-
nated by a limited number of large, long-standing London firms, 
we have identified those which either had a member on the first 
Council of the ICAEW or were formed 15 years or more prior 
to 1880 [Boys, 1994, pp. 17-18, 56-58; see also, Parker, 1980, 
pp. 36, 39-42; Matthews et al., 1998, pp. 283-322]. This exercise 
produced a list of 30 London “founder” firms. The numbers of 
Council seats occupied by partners in these firms and quali-
fied accountants employed at these firms at five dates between 
1920 and 1956 are given in Table 3.19 Corresponding figures also 
appear in Table 3 for “other London firms” and “non-London 
firms” in England and Wales. We have applied the chi-square 
test to examine the statistical significance, if any, of the differ-
ence in levels of Council representation at each of the five dates 
between London founder firms and the other two groups. At the 
first two study dates (1920 and 1929), the results were signifi-
cant at the 5% level, given there is only one degree of freedom. 
For 1939, the test proved significant at the 10% level. For 1946 
and 1956, the results were significant at neither the 5% nor 10% 
18 The officially recorded justification for London’s preferment in terms of 
Council seats was the distance between many provincial areas and London where 
the meetings of the Council and its committees were held [Council Minutes Book 
O, p. 227; File 1487].
19 From the Companies Act 1862 to the Companies Act 1967, there existed a 
provision prohibiting, in principle, partnerships of more than 20 members. The 
number of qualified accountants employed in accountancy firms, rather than the 
number of partners, is therefore considered to be a better indication of the size of 
the accountancy firm.
21
Noguchi and Edwards: Professional leadership and oligarchy: The case of the ICAEW
Published by eGrove, 2008

























































































































































































































































































ists for 1947, 1957
22
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/2
23Noguchi and Edwards, ICAEW Leadership
levels. Given these significance levels, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, before World War II, London founder firms were 
continuously over-represented on Council though this effect was 
diminishing, but that this was no longer the case after the war.20
TABLE 3 








1920 no.  % no. % no. % no.
Council seats 16 35.6% 10 22.2% 19 42.2% 45 100%
ICAEW members 148 20.6% 210 29.2% 362 50.3% 720 100%
1929
Council seats 15 33.3% 11 24.4% 19 42.2% 45 100%
ICAEW members 334 18.4% 540 29.8% 937 51.7% 1,811 100%
1939
Council seats 16 35.6% 8 17.8% 21 46.7% 45 100%
ICAEW members 601 23.8% 723 28.6% 1,203 47.6% 2,527 100%
1946
Council seats 16 35.6% 8 17.8% 21 46.7% 45 100%
ICAEW members 406 27.8% 338 23.1% 717 49.1% 1,461 100%
1956
Council seats 15 37.5% 6 15.0% 19 47.5% 40 100%
ICAEW members 681 32.4% 445 21.2% 976 46.4% 2,102 100%
Source: Membership Lists for 1921, 1930, 1940, 1947, 1957
To examine further the extent to which councilors were 
recruited by “a sort of ‘apostolic succession’” [Accountant, May 
21, 1904, p. 669], 60 long-standing provincial firms were identi-
fied through the same procedure used to detect the 30 London 
founder firms. From the combined list of 90 founder firms, we 
were able to calculate that 157 (58.4%) of the 269 councilors in 
public practice over the period 1880-1970 stemmed from those 
origins. Even if we exclude the original 45 members, we find that 
112 (50.0%) of the 224 members subsequently appointed to the 
Council had the founder-firm root. Despite the rule established 
in 1883, restricting to a maximum of two the number of partners 
in the same firm and working from the same principal place 
of business serving on the Council at the same time [Council 
 Minutes Book Y, p. 4; File 1490], 64 of 112 (57.1%), councilors 
20 One reason for this change was that, during World War II, the London 
founder-firm membership fell by only 32.5%, whereas that of other firms fell by 
45.2%. Hence the imbalance of the pre-war era was resolved, not by a proportion-
ate reduction in the number of Council seats for London founder firms, but a 
larger fall in membership among other firms.
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were recruited from just 19 large London firms.21 Moreover, 36 
of the 112 members (32.1%) and 30 of the 64 London councilors 
(46.9%) were there as the result of “apostolic succession,” i.e., a 
partner from the same firm was appointed to replace a councilor 
who had resigned.
Turning to business members’ representation, we have seen 
that they had no representation whatsoever on the Council until 
1943, and that they received their first quota allocation of five 
out of 45 seats or 11.1% in 1950. We have also seen that business 
members accounted for 17.2% of traceable membership as early 
as 1939, and we are able to interpolate from Table 1 a business 
membership of about 30% between 1946 and 1956. Later, in 
1964, according to an estimate made by a GPC sub-committee, 
“10,000 or more members of the Institute…are engaged in com-
merce and industry” [GPC Minute Book R, pp. 135-136] at a 
time when the total U.K. membership was 23,285 [Membership 
List, 1964]. Therefore, even when the quota was increased to 15 
out of 60 in 1965, business members were still seriously under-
represented on the Council.
The evidence presented in this section reveals that, consis-
tent with criticisms directed at the composition of the Council 
by the ICAEW’s members and the press, its non-representative 
character persisted throughout the period 1880-1970, despite a 
series of initiatives designed to improve the situation.
A Self-Perpetuating Oligarchy – the Historical Dimension: In this 
section so far, we have studied changes made by the ICAEW in 
response to continuous and vehement criticism of the self-elect-
ed characteristic of the Council and the under-representation of 
a variety of sectional interests. We have also seen that two world 
wars provided important opportunities to review critically the 
oligarchic nature of the Council. World War I made influential 
chartered accountants aware of the growing importance of busi-
ness accounting within the portfolio of work that constituted 
contemporary professional practice and encouraged progres-
sive practitioners, such as Mark Webster Jenkinson, to sup-
port claims from business members for representation on the 
Council. World War II, against the background of a substantial 
21 These included Price, Waterhouse & Co. (9 councilors); Cooper Brothers & 
Co. (7); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (6); Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co. (6); 
Turquand, Youngs & Co. (5); Whinney, Smith & Whinney (4); Kemp, Chatteris, 
Nichols, Sendell & Co. (4); Binder, Hamlyn & Co. (4); Barton, Mayhew & Co. (4); 
James & Edwards (3); Josolyne, Miles, Page & Co. (2); Harmood Banner & Co. (2); 
and Cash, Stone & Co. (2). 
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increase in business membership within the ICAEW, encour-
aged people such as E.M. Taylor again to highlight the issue of 
business members’ representation.22 These findings support the 
argument that “democratization tends to follow war” [Mitchell, 
1999, p. 771].
We have seen that a number of changes were made that 
caused the Council to become more representative of the mem-
bership in 1970 than at foundation date. Despite such changes, 
however, we must conclude that the fundamental nature of the 
Council, as a self-elected oligarchy, remained substantially intact, 
with the mechanisms employed to defend that characteristic 
including (1) the quota system used to allocate Council seats to 
London and provincial societies; (2) the re-election of retiring 
members; (3) the Council’s power to fill a vacancy arising be-
tween AGMs; (4) the Council’s power to choose between nomina-
tions put forward by the provincial societies; (5) the Council’s 
control over the consultation process with the London & District 
Society; (6) the creation of “pools” of non-practicing members 
with Council retaining the power to choose between nominations 
put forward; and (7) the co-option of additional “suitable” mem-
bers at the absolute discretion of the Council. These mechanisms 
comprise overwhelming evidence of “weak procedural guaran-
tees in competitive elections” highlighted as important features 
of an oligarchic leadership by Jenkins [1977, p. 570]. 
The Council of the ICAEW also exploited its command over 
organizational resources [Lipset et al., 1956; Jenkins, 1977, p. 
569] in other ways to maintain its traditional character and to 
silence, sideline, or pacify dissatisfaction among members over 
their interest representation on Council. Tactics employed in-
cluded the formation of various advisory and consultative com-
mittees such as the Special Committee (1919), the London Mem-
bers’ Committee (1920), the Taxation and Financial Relations 
Committee (1942), the GPC Sub-Committee (Non-Practising 
Members) (1951), and the Consultative Committee of Members 
in Commerce and Industry (1957). These placating measures 
each played a role to help to moderate members’ dissatisfaction 
with the Council.
22 Taylor, at the 1941 AGM, stated that “I have come to the conclusion that re-
forms must take place in the structure of the Council…There are many problems 
facing us to-day…when the war is over and hundreds, possibly thousands, of our 
members come back to civil life, and possibly 1,500 article clerks with little, if any, 
professional experience come to take up business life... a broader representation 
on the Council is going to be beneficial to the Institute as a whole” [Accountant, 
May 17, 1941, pp. 376-377].
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The oligarchic character of the Council of the ICAEW ex-
isted from the outset and was most intensively attacked immedi-
ately following organizational formation in 1880. Michels [1962, 
p. 167] observes that “With the institution of leadership there 
simultaneously begins…the transformation into a closed circle.” 
Osterman [2006, p. 623], on this same issue, comments that:
The question of timing…becomes the practical one of 
the length of time it takes to create a self-sustaining 
 bureaucratic apparatus and internal political system. 
Put this way, it is apparent that there is no universal an-
swer to the timing question. It depends on the charac-
teristics of the organization in question, such as size of 
membership, geographic scope, history, and so forth. 
The historical dimension is highly significant for this case 
study. We have seen that the ICAEW was formed from the merg-
er of five existing institutions. Among these, the elite body was 
the Institute of Accountants which dominated the merger nego-
tiations [Walker, 2004] and also the composition of the ICAEW’s 
initial Council [Edwards et al., 2005]. The Institute of Account-
ants had, in 1876, been accused by its members of arbitrary and 
selective procedures for appointing councilors which, as in the 
case of Kemp’s justification for an ICAEW Council consisting of 
the “great and the good” in 1883, was explained by the need for 
a strong public profile [Walker, 2004, p. 142]. This latter theme 
was given particular emphasis by Ernest Cooper who, we have 
seen, also staunchly defended the composition of the ICAEW’s 
Council when president in 1901. As a highly active member of 
the Institute of Accountants in the 1870s, Cooper advocated re-
forms directed towards achieving improved recognition for the 
profession [cited in Walker, 2004, p. 291]:
Can it be doubted that if the Institute after the Scotch 
System was introduced here had been actively engaged 
during the past seven years in ascertaining who are 
the respectable Accountants and inducing them to join 
the Institute that the profession would have assumed 
a much higher position in relation to the contemplated 
Bankruptcy reform? 
For Cooper, to increase the number of “respectable” accountants 
within the small membership of the elite Institute of Account-
ants and to have “the best possible men” on the Council of the 
ICAEW were probably consistent objectives in the sense that 
both enhanced the influence of the organization in making rep-
resentation to the government over the content of legislation re-
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lating to the accountants’ business. We might therefore conclude 
[see also, Walker, 2004, p. 139] that the Council of the Institute 
of Accountants in London institutionalized its character as a 
self-perpetuating elite during the 1870s, an historical character-
istic inherited by the ICAEW. 
The most important difference between the real case of the 
Council of the ICAEW and oligarchy typically envisaged in the 
political theory of organization is in motive. In theory, oligarchy 
emerges because the positions occupied by leaders of the organi-
zation “provide them with economic rewards and social status” 
[Osterman, 2006, p. 623]. However, in the process whereby the 
ICAEW Council initially formed and subsequently maintained 
an oligarchic characteristic, evidence of the councilors enjoying 
direct personal gains from their positions remains unidentified, 
although, as Smallpeice [1944, p. 46] recognized, achieving the 
position of councilor itself represented “a high honour for prac-
tising members and is much prized…as a mark of esteem and 
a reward for outstanding service in the profession.” Aside from 
personal motives, the dominant concern when constructing the 
composition of the Council was to maintain and enhance, as 
indicated by Kemp’s 1883 comment, the political influence of 
the ICAEW in making representations to the government over, 
for example, the content of legislation relating to its business. 
From its experience when acquiring the Royal Charter in 1880, 
the Council of the ICAEW appears to have assumed that the in-
fluence of councilors from the London founding firms would be 
of crucial importance for the purpose of maintaining its political 
standing.
Reflecting its oligarchic character, the biased composition 
of Council proved highly significant in a negative sense at the 
time of the 1970 scheme for integrating the six senior profes-
sional accountancy bodies in Britain. It was members who were 
either not represented or under-represented on the Council that 
featured prominently in rejecting the leadership’s plans. The po-
litical crisis is next examined.
THE 1970 INTEGRATION SCHEME
The 1970 merger plan had been approved by five of the 
six senior professional bodies involved when, “virtually at the 
last moment, a campaign was launched by two members of 
the English Institute” [Tricker, 1983, p. 40]. H.T. Nicholson and 
B.W. Sutherland criticized the integration scheme as involving 
“an unacceptable dilution of the high professional standards 
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of the Institute” [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 73]. It is widely 
acknowledged that, principally as the result of latent opposition 
mobilized by their intervention, the integration scheme was re-
jected by 16,845 votes against 13,700 with 64.1% of the ICAEW’s 
membership taking part in the poll. 
For Nicholson and Sutherland, the scheme had been pro-
jected by “‘men in a hurry’, who refused to recognize that sound 
development could only come by a process of steady evolution, 
and were obsessed with the idea of creating the biggest body 
of accountants in the world” [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 73]. 
As far as business members were concerned, integration would 
result in “people [becoming] called chartered accountants 
who have never worked in a professional office” [Accountancy, 
September 1970, p. 635; see also, File 1477: 17 (34)]. For pro-
vincial practitioners, integration was considered to produce “an 
unacceptable dilution” of status [Accountant, July 16, 1970, p. 
73; see also, Accountancy, September 1970, pp. 635, 637]. And 
for younger members who had recently suffered the trauma of 
qualifying examinations, integration was seen as a retrograde 
step that would lessen the value of the chartered credential [Ac-
countancy, June 1966, p. 443].
The outcome was described in the ICAEW’s mouthpiece, 
Accountancy [September 1970, p. 637], as “a disaster for the ac-
countancy profession as a whole, and for the Institute especial-
ly,” while The Accountant [August 20, 1970, pp. 229-230] made 
the following assessment of events:
it might have been tempting to accuse a few individuals, 
whose opposition has been particularly determined and 
perhaps more articulate than most, of having wrecked 
the scheme; but it seems plain that these gentlemen 
have done nothing more than to provide, at the most, 
a focus for the considerable measure of dissatisfaction 
and dissent which already existed. 
Within the confines of Moorgate Place, similar sentiments 
were expressed in a less gracious manner by the then-president 
of the ICAEW, C. Croxton-Smith [Council Minutes Book AC, p. 
383]:
Over the past ten years…some 20,000 new members 
had been admitted. Many of these were in small indus-
trial companies and felt that they derived little benefit 
from membership other than the qualification which 
they wished to retain at a minimum cost. The integra-
tion scheme had produced an unholy alliance between 
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these members and some small practitioners whose mo-
tives for rejection of the proposals were quite different. 
The people leading opposition to the scheme, Nicholson and 
Sutherland, partly attributed failure of the integration initiative 
to the fact [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 636] that:
the Council [of the ICAEW] is not really in touch with 
the body of the members. They are all very busy men, 
and we are certainly not attacking them personally. It 
is more a fault of the system. There should be far fewer 
papers to read, and more chances to talk to the ‘con-
stituents’…If they are not careful they lose touch with 
grass-roots opinion, and this is what happened in this 
case. 
An in-depth study of the integration episode conducted by 
Shackleton and Walker [2001, pp. 277-278] locates the “detach-
ment of office bearers [the Council] from their constituents [the 
members]” as “perhaps the most notable feature of the unifi-
cation attempt of the 1960s.” They continue [Shackleton and 
Walker, 2001, pp. 277, 280; see also, Willmott, 1986, p. 571]: “As 
was starkly revealed in August 1970, it is ultimately the member-
ships of the professional bodies who have the power to accept or 
reject constitutional change,” and conclude: “The price of a dis-
dainful and non-consultative approach towards the membership 
was revealed when the result of the ICAEW ballot was declared.” 
Evidence of “Detachment” and “Disdain”: The under-represen-
tation of business members and provincial practitioners on the 
Council was not, therefore, simply a matter of principle; the 
biased composition had implications for how the ruling body 
behaved. It meant that they failed to comprehend the conflict 
between the priorities of business, provincial, and also younger 
members compared with those of the leadership dominated by 
the big London firms. But it went even further than that and, 
in this sub-section, building on Shackleton and Walker’s [2001] 
findings, we present specific evidence of a lack of respect on 
the part of the Council for legitimate concerns expressed by the 
membership. 
Statements of Auditing: A series of Statements of Auditing was 
launched by the ICAEW in 1958 to help auditors fulfill their 
obligation under the Companies Act 1948 to express an opinion 
on whether a company’s published accounts “give a true and 
fair view” [T&R Committee Minutes Book B, p. 259]. The series 
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was soon the subject of severe criticism from regional district 
societies. For example, the Statement dealing with the auditor’s 
duty in relation to stock-in-trade (1961) was opposed by five 
provincial societies (Manchester, Northern, Nottingham, South 
Eastern, and South Wales) on the grounds that it was “in some 
respects in advance of current practice and might prejudice the 
position of auditors in law by appearing to render attendance 
at stock taking mandatory” [T&R Committee Minutes Book C, 
p. 164]. The Manchester Society was particularly worried about 
the workload of the small practitioner [Council Minutes Book 
T, p. 235], while the London & District Society drew attention 
to the apprehension expressed by a “substantial minority” of its 
membership to an official document that amounted to a “volun-
tary extension of the auditor’s responsibility” [London & District 
Society Minutes Book D, p. 98]. 
The Chairman of the ICAEW’s Parliamentary and Law Com-
mittee, H.A. Benson of Cooper Brothers, nevertheless informed 
the January 1962 meeting of Council [Council Minutes Book T, 
p. 212] that:
it was in the interests of the profession that the docu-
ment [on stock] should be issued as soon as possible 
particularly having regard to the [Ninth] International 
Congress [of Accountants] to be held in New York in 
September 1962 when it was important that the Insti-
tute should be able to demonstrate that it is a leader in 
auditing standards. 
It appears that political considerations arising from the U.S. 
case of McKesson & Robbins (1939)23 were driving the leader-
ship’s actions. The Council attempted to make “attendance to 
observe stocktaking” an effective obligation for small as well as 
large public practices partly, at least, to enable the ICAEW to be 
seen as leading the development of U.K. auditing standards at 
the upcoming event.24
23 When accepting the audit of McKesson & Robbins Ltd. in 1924, Price, Wa-
terhouse & Co. agreed not to make a physical examination of inventories. One 
consequence was an audit failure to detect $10,100,000 of fictitious stock and the 
introduction of U.S. regulations requiring this to be done [Baxter, 1999, pp. 157, 
162; Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 259].
24 Another example of a disregard for views expressed by provincial practi-
tioners occurred in 1966 when “a majority of the regions” opposed the issue of a 
statement on “auditing procedures in connection with the verification of invest-
ments” [Various Sub-Committees Minutes Book D, p. 102].
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Fellowship Rules: The ICAEW’s Royal Charter divided member-
ship into two categories, fellows and associates, with senior 
fellowship status confined to those who had been continuously 
in practice as public accountants for five years. With business 
members often leaving public practice soon after qualification, it 
was therefore unusual for them to achieve fellowship status. As 
early as 1922, several issues of The Accountant [March 11, 1922, 
p. 331; March 18, 1922, p. 384; April 15, 1922, p. 507] published 
letters from business members requesting an extension of the 
fellowship arrangements. 
We have seen that, as the number of business members in-
creased significantly (Table 1), pressure for representation on the 
Council grew. The same was the case with the fellowship issue, 
with H.F. Bowser and J. Sandford Smith tackling the secretary 
of the ICAEW, R.W. Bankes, on the issue in 1944. Because of the 
two-tier scheme of credentials, in Bowser’s estimation, “the view 
is fairly generally held that Associate Members of the Institute in 
England are a kind of inferior brand of Chartered Accountant” 
[Ms.28435/2; File 0436]. Sandford Smith also focused on the 
implications of the fellowship rules within the public domain 
[Ms.28435/2; File 0436]:
While all accountants know that 5 years in practice is 
the only qualification at present called for to obtain the 
fellowship, the business world generally is not aware of 
this fact and attaches a notable degree of importance to 
the difference between an A.C.A. and a F.C.A. 
The request for access to fellowship status was referred to 
the Charter and Bye-laws Sub-Committee in 1946, where it was 
resisted by such luminaries as Sir Harold Howitt of Peat, Mar-
wick, Mitchell & Co. [Ms.28435/2; File 0436]. Council’s nega-
tive decision drew a critical response from business members, 
eliciting a promise to review the matter and solicit the views of 
district societies [Accountant, May 1, 1948, p. 345]. Despite the 
discovery that seven district societies either favored or had no 
objection to reform, compared with five against, the GPC report-
ed that “there is no real demand for fellowship from the general 
body of associates not in practice” and that “fellowship should 
continue to mark responsibility of the accountant in practice” 
[File 0436]. The Council in January 1950 confirmed the GPC’s 
conclusion that “it is undesirable that a new bye-law be intro-
duced to provide for the election to fellowship of members not 
in practice” [Council Minutes Book O, p. 47]. 
Dispute over the extension of fellowship status to business 
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members rumbled on and was not settled until the proposal that 
“associates [automatically] become fellows on the first day of 
January which follows the completion of ten years’ membership 
of the Institute” [Council Minutes Book S, pp. 2-3] was carried 
at the 1959 AGM and confirmed overwhelmingly by a vote of 
14,231 in favor compared with 3,825 against. 
The detached and disdainful attitude of the Council towards 
the wider membership is further reflected in a report prepared 
by a GPC sub-committee (1964) at around the time that the 
move for integration was about to surface. It contained the fol-
lowing somewhat arrogant assertion in relation to governance 
[GPC Minutes Book S, p. 58]:
Whilst constitutionally members of the Council are 
elected by the membership as a whole, the Council can-
not absolve itself from the responsibility for ensuring 
that only men of right calibre and who between them 
cover the wide range of knowledge which is needed on 
standing committees [of the Council] are selected.
The report added [GPC Minutes Book R, pp. 135-136]:
whilst it is right that due regard be paid to services ren-
dered to a district society, the emphasis when consider-
ing the election of new members [of the Council] must 
be designed to secure the services of the best men in 
the profession compatible with the current needs of the 
Council. 
ELECTORAL REFORMS POST 1970
Rejection of the integration scheme spectacularly revealed 
the willingness and ability of the rank-and-file to challenge the 
authority of the Council. Moreover, it provided “a dramatic 
shock to traditional ideas about [the ICAEW’s form of] gover-
nance” [Tricker, 1983, pp. 40-41], and, as an immediate response 
to the “disaster” [Accountancy, September 1970, p. 637], the 
Council appointed a Committee chaired by Douglas Morpeth of 
Touche Ross with broad terms of reference, “to consider the ob-
jectives of the Institute and the policies it should pursue” [Coun-
cil Minutes Book AC, p. 275]. The accounting press welcomed 
the appointment of a young committee with “an average age 
of 44” [Accountant, October 15, 1970, p. 502] which comprised 
“members from all sides of the profession, including those in 
practices both large and small, those employed in a range of 
capacities by industrial companies of various sizes, and those in 
education” [Accountancy, November 1970, p. 756].
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The Morpeth Committee reiterated concerns that appoint-
ments to the Council were not made on a “fully democratic ba-
sis” [Accountant, February 24, 1972, p. 237]. Recommendations 
for district society-based elections by postal ballot were judged 
to have three advantages – elections would be democratic; there 
would be a greater likelihood of members knowing the candi-
dates; and it might also stimulate the interest of members in 
their local society’s activities. Accountancy [June 1971, p. 293] 
welcomed the proposals on the grounds that “Many members 
look upon the Council as some form of self-perpetuating oligar-
chy” whereas “a postal ballot will appear more democratic to the 
average member.”
The Council presented the proposals to a special meeting 
on September 27, 1972, where they were approved with 6,792 
(97.5%) votes in favor and just 173 against [Accountant, October 
5, 1972, p. 416]. Accountancy [April 1983, p. 25] later assessed 
the underlying philosophy of the reforms in a broadly favorable 
manner:
a system of regular Council elections by District Soci-
ety areas was introduced [in 1972], giving members a 
decisive role in the selection and control of Council…
In particular, the Council considers it both ‘entirely 
proper and in accordance with modern practice’ that a 
democratically-elected Council should have the power 
to manage the Institute’s affairs. 
We can conclude that the Morpeth Committee’s central rec-
ommendations, direct election at district society level by postal 
ballot was an important break from the past system for electing 
councilors.
Subsequent Developments: At the time of the 1972 reforms, The 
Accountant [July 6, 1972, p. 3] conjectured that the new arrange-
ments might “place upon the membership a heavier burden than 
some have hitherto shown themselves prepared to bear…apathy 
and inanition, unless checked, could rapidly prevent the new 
measures from accomplishing anything better.” These concerns 
proved well-founded with annual elections conducted under the 
new scheme between 1973 and 199425 attracting turnouts rang-
ing from 15.2% to 24.1% [File 1490]. In Tricker’s [1983, p. 30] es-
25 In 1995, further important amendments to the system of election were 
made as the term of election was shortened from six to four years; the number of 
elected members enlarged from 60 to 70; and the introduction of “assured” seats, 
with one seat per constituency reserved for a business member [File 1489].
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timation, “the Institute is remote from the immediate concerns 
of most members and its governance is a matter of singularly 
little importance to them.” This loss of commitment and energy 
on the part of the membership, a typical symptom of oligarchic 
leadership, is called “becalming” by Zald and Ash [1966, p. 334] 
and described as follows by Michels [1962, pp. 60-61]:
The indifference which in normal times the mass is ac-
customed to display in ordinary political life becomes, 
in certain cases of particular importance, an obstacle 
to the extension of the party influence. The crowd may 
abandon the leaders at the very moment when these 
are preparing for energetic action…Accustomed to be 
ruled, the rank and file need a considerable work of 
preparation before they can be set in motion. 
As a consequence of the oligarchic leadership structure that 
dated from the creation of the ICAEW, the membership seems 
to have eventually lost interest in the election of councilors,26 
but when major strategic decisions need to be made, as in 
1970, they are galvanized into action. For example, plans for 
the introduction of radical, new current cost accounting-based 
financial reporting models were the subject of revolts, led by D. 
Keymer and M. Haslam, that produced turnouts of 46% (28,696) 
of the membership to reject Exposure Draft 18 in 1977 and 
41.4% (30,557) to vote on calls for the “immediate withdrawal” 
of Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 16 two years later 
[Tweedie and Whittington, 1984, pp. 135-136, 147-148]. Merger 
initiatives involving CIPFA in 1990 and 2005 also generated sub-
stantial turnouts, 36% and 44% respectively. Indeed, the issues 
that motivated members into action included not only those di-
rectly affecting their immediate interests, but also those that did 
26 In this connection, Leach [2005, p. 331] suggests that “It could be that the 
majority was happy to leave the work of governance to a minority, as long as that 
minority remained accountable and did not jeopardize the majority’s interests. 
But as often happens with long-term incumbency, this abdication of responsibility, 
however consensual it might be, can easily lead to a situation of dependence where 
people do not feel entitled or qualified to intervene – even when they suspect 
their interests are being threatened – because they have not been involved in the 
process.” If the minority then indeed makes illegitimate decisions exceeding the 
range consigned by, and threatening the interests of, the majority, the situation 
clearly illustrates a case in which directional flow of causation between oligarchic 
leadership and members’ loss of commitment is reversed. However, in the case 
of the ICAEW during the period from 1880 to 1970, the reversed directional 
flow of causation is inapplicable because the oligarchic character of the Council 
 existed from the outset in 1880, and a series of members’ requests for reform then 
followed at least up until 1965.
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not, such as the Council’s plan to introduce options into the final 
examination. Moreover, the membership even proved capable 
of instigating a radical scheme designed to achieve democratic 
election of the ICAEW’s president, an initiative pursued for the 
purpose of avoiding maldistribution of power and “to make sure 
one section of the membership [Council] does not exercise tyr-
anny” [Accountancy, July 1996, p. 11].
When the new electoral system was introduced in 1972, Ac-
countancy [August 1972, p. 4] drew attention to the difficulty of 
recruiting suitable candidates from under-represented sectors 
and specifically suggested that “it will be no easier for senior 
employees of larger companies to serve on the Council under 
the new system than under the old.” It was anticipated that at 
least some of these concerns could be effectively addressed by 
substantially increasing the Council’s powers to co-opt, from 6 
to 20 members, but achievement of a proper balance between 
job interests in fact proved elusive. The number of elected busi-
ness members initially increased from 15 (25.0% of a total of 60 
elected councilors) in 1972 to 18 (30.0%) in 1981, but then fell to 
10 (16.7%) by 1994. Compared with their total U.K. membership 
(37.8% in 1983, 40.2% in 1990, and 57.3% in 2001), business 
members remained heavily under-represented on a Council still 
dominated by practitioners.27 This continued imbalance did 
nothing to resolve concerns about the availability to the Council 
of the full range of specialist knowledge impinging upon the 
activities of the ICAEW’s membership. Another cause of anxiety 
was the lack of continuity in the expertise available to the Coun-
cil, with 137 new members elected as the result of vacancies 
arising during the period from 1973 to 1994. To address these 
issues, the Council made good use of its extended power to co-
opt, with such members rising from three (4.8% of a total of 80 
councilors) in 1972 to the full complement of 20 (25%) ten years 
later [Council Minutes Books AA-AV; File 1490]. This enabled 
the Council to bring in business members and academics to 
supply specialist knowledge not otherwise available to it, as well 
as past-presidents and former chairs of Council committees to 
supply “executive talents” [Tricker, 1983, p. 27], experience, and 
continuity in the governance of Institute affairs. 
Nevertheless, continuing concern with the lack of interest 
and involvement of the members in the elections of councilors 
and, therefore, the lack of Council’s own legitimacy, led to a 
27 File 0433; File 7-8-5; Accountancy, August 1990, p. 162; http://www.icaew.
co.uk/institute/statistics/document.asp.
35
Noguchi and Edwards: Professional leadership and oligarchy: The case of the ICAEW
Published by eGrove, 2008
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200836
 series of committees being appointed (Worsley 1983-1985, Green 
1990-1991, Woodley 1993, Gerrard 1996) whose reports resulted 
in a plethora of administrative changes to the composition of the 
Council (e.g.; increase in elected membership to 70, extension 
of powers of co-option to include large-firm partners, younger 
members, and chairs of Boards and Faculties) and the system 
of governance (e.g.; creation of the office of chief executive, the 
Executive Committee, and the office of secretary-general).
The Council also strove to reach out to different segments of 
the membership and, thereby, directly stimulate interest in In-
stitute affairs by establishing “Boards,” “Faculties,” and “Focus 
Groups” [Accountancy, November 1985, p. 181; June 2000, p. 
10]. These initiatives succeeded as judged by the numbers join-
ing [Accountancy, January 1991, p. 15; July 2000, p. 24; August 
2000, p. 24], but failed to connect the members’ interests with 
the election of councilors which continued to be based on the 
geographical areas represented by the district societies without 
giving any electorate status to these job-interest groups. 
We can therefore see that, in the period following the politi-
cal crisis of 1970, the Council made serious efforts to overcome 
symptoms of oligarchic leadership and revitalize the member-
ship [Voss and Sharman, 2000, pp. 304-305]. In the Council’s 
own words, since 1970, it has searched for “the methods by 
which we could ensure that Council is representative of the 
membership; the steps to be taken to involve members fully in 
policy development; the [better] relationship of district societies 
with Moorgate Place; and the way in which we look after the 
interests of our members” [Accountancy, June 1991, p. 8]. How-
ever, the fact that members still remained disconnected in 1991, 
and there is no evidence that the situation has since improved, is 
indicated in the following comment made in that year [Account-
ancy, December 1991, p. 20]:
a growing number of members have been asking wheth-
er the services the Institute provides represent value for 
money. From their point of view, the increasing finan-
cial burden of maintaining the chartered accountancy 
title, at a time when resources are under pressure, 
involves a substantial outflow of those resources for 
which they say that they see little in return in terms of 
protecting and representing their interests. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Between 1880 and 1970, the Council of the ICAEW respond-
ed to membership requests for better representation by making 
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changes to the constitution of the Council. These changes failed 
to alter the fundamental nature of the Council as a self-elective 
oligarchy substantially biased in favor of large London founder 
firms. This historically contingent but deep-seated characteristic 
of the Council was protected mainly through (1) continuous 
re-election of retiring members; (2) Council’s control over the 
 process of filling vacancies; and (3) arrangements for the Coun-
cil to co-opt “suitable” members. The Council also silenced, 
sidelined, or pacified dissatisfaction among members concern-
ing lack of representation on the Council by creating various 
ad visory and consultative committees. Consistent with the lit-
erature of political theory [Lipset et al., 1956; Jenkins, 1977, p. 
569], these are the tactics that the leadership of an organization 
typically wields to maintain its oligarchic character. However, 
the Council wished to maintain its traditional character, not 
principally for the purpose of direct personal gain as normally 
envisaged by the political theory of organization, but mainly to 
maintain political influence [Richardson, 1989; Walker, 2004, 
p.142] when making representations to the government over 
the content of legislation relating to the practicing accountants’ 
business.
This historical study has revealed that the oligarchic char-
acter of Council, as theoretically prescribed, caused the leader-
ship to become complacent, possibly disdainful, and certainly 
detached from the interests of the membership, as demonstrated 
when issuing Statements of Auditing and, for many years, re-
sisting changes to the fellowship rules. These kinds of actions, 
combined with the continuing dissatisfaction with lack of 
representation on the Council, resulted in the disregarded sec-
tions – business members, provincial practitioners, and younger 
members – being mainly responsible for rejecting the integration 
scheme in 1970. 
Between 1970 and1972, the electoral system of Council was 
reformed, with an internal review acknowledging the fact that 
under the new arrangements, there could “be no restriction on 
the way the electorate nominates or votes and no attempt by the 
Council to ‘rig’ elections by insisting on a specified type of can-
didate or preventing certain candidates from standing. It was for 
the electorate itself to determine such matters” [File 1490].
The reforms introduced district society-based elections by 
postal ballot and have been hailed as “An attempt…to involve 
members in the governance process, to emphasize the geo-
graphical constituencies and to highlight the representation of 
members on Council” [Tricker, 1983, p. 41]. In practice, the new 
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system failed to arouse members from their “becalmed” attitude 
[Zald and Ash, 1966] towards ICAEW affairs. Nor have numer-
ous subsequent initiatives proved successful in increasing the 
general level of membership involvement in Council elections. 
When, however, the leadership has attempted to take the ICAEW 
in some radical new direction, the level of interest becomes 
relatively substantial and opposition to the Council’s plans often 
unambiguous.
In brief, actions taken by the rank-and-file have persistently 
shown that Council’s authority remains seriously diminished. 
Although the Council installed a more democratic system for 
electing new leaders, it failed to stimulate the members’ interest 
so that they might connect better with the leadership. While we 
do not claim that the 1970 debacle irretrievably damaged the au-
thority of the leadership, it is certainly the case that the “disas-
ter” fundamentally problematized the governance arrangements 
and heralded the start of a period of continuous reform that has 
not borne fruit.
Within the U.K., the ICAEW is not alone in grappling with 
problems of governance. A recent academic study [Friedman 
and Phillips, 2004] of models of control within professional as-
sociations reports the conclusions of a seminar held at Birkbeck 
College, University of London (November 28, 2000), entitled 
“Governance for Professional Associations in the 21st Century.” 
The seminar, arranged by the Professional Association Research 
Network (PARN), was attended by representatives of 35 profes-
sional bodies, including the ICAEW.28 These delegates shared 
a concern that their governance structures were inadequate to 
meet the demands placed on them. In particular, they identified 
“composition of councils and electoral process” as a major issue 
leading to difficulties in conducting policy formulation and in 
arriving at strategic decisions [Friedman and Phillips, 2004, pp. 
194-195]. Friedman and Phillips [2004, p. 188] conclude that 
“Even the associations of professionals from which many top 
business executives are drawn, such as accountancy and law, 
have suffered from crisis and failures in governance.” 
The PARN seminar is significant in highlighting the prob-
lem of leadership legitimacy faced by professional bodies today. 
When considering how best to reform the constitution of the 
28 The seminar led to the PARN undertaking a research project co-sponsored 
by the ICAEW. The research findings were presented at a seminar, entitled “Gover-
nance: the management of change and the management of risk,” held at Woburn 
House, Tavistock Square, London, on January 8, 2003.
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Council, the ICAEW had in fact researched and sometimes 
imitated election arrangements put in place by the governing 
bodies of other professional associations. Such bodies included 
not only other accountancy associations but also other profes-
sional organizations such as the Law Society, Royal College of 
Surgeons, Royal Institute of British Architects, and the Char-
tered Surveyors’ Institution [Ms.28432/19; Ms.28448]. Through 
the PARN, or alternative forums, the ICAEW might gain further 
insights into the measures taken by other bodies to deal with 
the legitimacy issue. To promote the mutual learning process, 
further research into other organizations might help clarify the 
nature of the issue of governance of professional associations by, 
for example, comparison with the case of the ICAEW.29
For the present, this study enables us to predict that the 
ICAEW’s quest for a scheme to address better the need for rep-
resentative and effective governance of a professional body will 
continue into the future and, until that problem is resolved, the 
crisis of authority that the Council has repeatedly experienced in 
its recent history is likely to recur.
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